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LEGALITY AND EFFICACY OF WAR/ EXCLUSION ZONES



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ACRONYMS

MD	-	British Maritime Doctrine
R	-	Books of Reference
Z	-	Exclusive Zone
DP	-	Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan
EZ	-	Maritime Exclusive Zone
Z	-	Maritime Zone
N	-	Pakistan Navy
EZ	-	Total Exclusive Zone
ATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DU	-	National Defence University
OTMAR	-	Notice to Mariners
N	-	United Nations
S	-	United State
W-I	-	World War – One
W-II	-	World War – Two

LEGALITY AND EFFICACY OF WAR/ EXCLUSION ZONES

1. Introduction

The maritime powers recognized the utility of maritime war zones to facilitate belligerent control of areas of the seas and as mechanisms to keep neutral commerce out of harm's way. These zones are designed to designate waters and superjacent airspace in which the declaring belligerent intends to exercise control over access of ships and aircraft, both of enemy and neutral. The lawfulness of such zones depends upon the extent and nature of their application. Over the years such zones have proven to be extremely useful for the declaring states in management of the contemporary battle space at sea. They serve the dual purpose of warning neutral platforms to avoid areas of potential hostile action and of advising both neutral and enemy merchant vessels and civil aircraft entering the zone that they may be subject to boarding, inspection, diversion, capture or destruction, depending upon their status and activity. For the declaring belligerent, such zones may facilitate a more accurate assessment of the character and intentions of platforms encountered in or over such waters. An effort has been made in this short study paper to see the legality and efficacy of these zones in the historical perspective and under various legal regulations and regime.

This study is aimed at examining wartime Maritime Exclusion Zones in an effort to study their legal aspect and to determine their usefulness to the belligerent forces conducting wartime operations at sea.

2. Historical perspective with different terminology for War Zones

The concept of maritime zones has been variously termed over the years, including descriptions such as "operational areas", "military exclusion zones", "exclusion zones," "total exclusion zones" , "war zones" "barred areas," etc. The Maritime operational zones established by belligerents in time of war also have a long history. Following are the examples of some prominent terms with their brief description:

WAR	(War) Zones	Brief description
WW-I	1. Danger Zone	The British were the first party to the conflict to establish a zone, termed as "danger zone" on 04 November 1914. This zone was established in response to indiscriminate mine laying on north sea region by Germany.
	2. Defensive Sea Areas	United States declared several such zones at various location (e.g. Gulf of Finland and Russian coast) during the war.
	3. Barred Zone	This German zone, which was described as a "barred" area, covered more than one million square miles of sea, including a large portion of the Mediterranean Sea.
WW-II	1. Small Exclusion Zone	Royal Navy established at strait of Skagerrak (Baltic mouth) on 8 May 1940, within this zone all ships were to be sunk on sight during the night[1].

[1] *Dönitz* Judgement, p. 558-9

	2. Combat Area.	On 04 November 1939, President Roosevelt declared a large area of the Eastern Atlantic Ocean to be a combat area.[2]The objective was to minimize the possibility of U.S. involvement.
	3. Free-Fire Zones	In 1939 Germans declared Free-Fire Zone in the area of eastern Atlantic region
	4. Neutrality Zone	Number of States in the Western Hemisphere adopted the Declaration of Panama on 03 October 1939, establishing a neutrality zone around the western hemisphere, excluding Canada. The belligerents were prohibited from any hostile, detention, capture, discharge of projectiles and placing of mines in the zone.
	5. Exclusion Zone	With respect to the war in the Pacific, the United States Navy waged anti-shipping campaign against Japanese. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U S declared an exclusion zone covering the entire Pacific Ocean and announced to engage all non-allied shipping.
Spanish Civil War	1. "War Zones" or "Blockade"	In 1936 Spain was divided between Republican government & Franco's National forces. The zone was established by "Republican" group with the objective to restrict European States to supply arms to one side or the other.
	2. Antisubmarine Exclusion Zone	British, French and Italian governments jointly decided that the warships of the International Naval Patrol should be authorized to attack (and destroy if possible) *any* submerged submarine encountered in their respective (i.e., British, French and Italy) zones.
Korean War	Close Blockade	On 4 July 1950, the United States imposed a blockade off the Korean coast[3]to support Republic of Korea in repelling the Northern Korean invaders and restoring peace.
Falkland Islands War 1982[4]	1. Maritime Exclusion Zone	The British Government on 12 Apr 82 established Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) ranged 200 nautical-mile around Falkland Island.
	2. Maritime Zone	On the day after Great Britain announced the MEZ, Argentina responded by declaring a 200 nautical mile maritime zone ("MZ") around the Falkland Islands, Georgia Islands and Argentine coast.
	4. Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ)	Upon the arrival of the British fleet in the waters off the Falklands Island, Great Britain on 28 April 1982 announced TEZ. The zone will apply not only to Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries but

[2] Presidential Proclamation No. 2376, 4 November 1939, 4 Federal Register 4495 (7 November 1939), reprinted in 34 AJIL (Supplement, No. 1, January 1940), pp. 58-59.

[3] The sea war in Korea by Malcom W. Cagle

[4] The Law of Naval Exclusion Zones, Mundis pg.82-96

		also to any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine forces. The TEZ will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation.
	5. Maritime Zone (strengthened by Argentina)	Apparently in response to the announcement of the British TEZ the preceding day i.e. 29 April 1982, Argentina strengthened its position with respect to the Maritime Zone announcement. Argentina asserted that all waters within its Maritime Zone were Argentine and that all British vessels, whether naval or merchant, and all British aircraft entering the zone would be subject to attack.

3. Nomenclature and Definition

It may be noted that nomenclature for (exclusion) zone in war scenario varied from time to time, so no definite definition can be derived. However in the San Remo Manual (covered in next para.) these zones were described under the title "zone". Moreover belligerents have been giving different name during war as mentioned in the above table. Referring to given question (Q.2) the exclusion zone and total exclusion zone come under same category, whereas security and safety zones are accounted as maritime zones related to the country protection and navigation etc in both peace and war time. The zones under question can define as follows:

3.1 Exclusion Zone

An exclusion zone is a territorial division established for various, case-specific purposes. As per the United States Department of Defense[5], an exclusion zone is a territory where sanctioning body prohibits specific activities in a specific geographic area. These zones are created for control of populations for safety, crowd control, or military purposes, or as a border zone, and they may be temporary or permanent.

3.2 Military Exclusion Zone

Geographical (usually maritime) area including parts of the high seas within which a government states its intention to enforce the exclusion of all military units of a designated nation or nations or other grouping, using force if necessary[6]. A military exclusion zone (also abbreviated as MEZ) is an area in the immediate vicinity of a military action established by a country to prevent the unauthorized entry of civilian personnel/equipment for their own safety or to protect natural assets already in place in the zone. It is also established to prevent an enemy from acquiring any material which could help them. The comparable term used by the air forces is that of no-fly zone.

[5] "exclusion zone", Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, United States Department of Defense, archived from the original on September 21, 2012, retrieved February 26, 2013

[6] Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan (MDP) December 2018. Pg.212

3.3 Total Exclusion Zone

Maritime geographical area including parts of the high seas within which a government declares its intention to enforce the exclusion of all ships and aircraft, both military and civilian of a designated nation(s) or other grouping, using force if necessary[7]. The Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) was an area declared by the United Kingdom on 30 April 1982 covering a circle of radius 200 nautical miles (370 km; 230 mi) from the centre of the Falkland Islands. During the Falklands War any sea vessel or aircraft from any country entering the zone may have been fired upon without further warning.

3.4 Maritime Exclusion Zone

The maritime exclusion zone is declaration by a state of sea areas, including parts of the high seas in which conditions are imposed on the passage of ships and aircraft[8]. A Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) is a type of warning zone in the maritime domain which got its prominence during the Falkland War. Mariners routinely use warning zones in various forms. Such warnings are often also issued in the form of a Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR). Generally speaking, a warning zone provides notice of potential danger in a specific geographic area. An MEZ is a very specific type of warning zone which is used by belligerents actively engaged in hostilities. The relevant warning of the MEZ is the danger associated with an active, shooting war at sea. In essence the MEZ tells mariners that there is a war going on in a particular area of the ocean. And entry into the area will pose certain risks inherent in war being conducted on the high seas. The establishment of an MEZ may be used for purely benign purposes by simply warning mariners not involved in the ongoing hostilities that a certain area is dangerous. On the other extreme, we will examine MEZs which essentially declare that any vessel in the zone is subject to attack without regard to nationality or purpose.

In the recent history the noteworthy uses of MEZs have been by Iraq and Iran during the Persian Gulf "Tanker War", and by Great Britain and Argentina in the Falklands (or Malvinas) War, during which MEZs were used by both belligerents. The Falklands War is a useful example because of the fact that the parties to the war began hostilities with relatively benignly defined MEZs which merely warned of potential danger in the area surrounding the Falkland Islands and then escalated their warnings to the point that, by the end of the rather short war, the warnings essentially told the world, "if you enter this area you may be sunk without further ado.

3.5 Security (or Defense) Zones

Security Zones are areas comprised of water or land, or a combination of both, to which access is limited for purposes of preventing the destruction, loss, or injury to vessels, harbors, ports, or waterfront facilities resulting from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or similar causes.

3.6 Safety Zones

Safety zones are establish for the protection of artificial islands, installations and structures located in internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial seas, EEZs and on continental shelves etc.

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[7] MDP December 2018. Pg.229

[8] The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BMD) BR 1806 . Pg.223

4. An Analysis of Maritime and Total Exclusion Zones in the Falklands Perspective

4.1 The Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) declared on 12 April 1982[2] covering a circle of radius 200 nautical miles (370 km; 230 mi) from the centre of the Falkland Islands. Any Argentine warship or naval auxiliary entering the MEZ could have been attacked by British nuclear-powered submarines (SSN).

4.2 On 23 April, in a message that was passed via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Argentine government, the British Government clarified that any Argentine ship or aircraft that was considered to pose a threat to British forces anywhere in the South Atlantic would be attacked:

4.3 In announcing the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands, Her Majesty's Government made it clear that this measure was without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in the exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In this connection Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft, which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft, including civil aircraft engaged in surveillance of these British forces, will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly[9].

4.4 The term civilian aircraft refers particularly, but not only, to the Boeing 707 of the Argentine Air Force that until then had shadowed the British Task Force on its journey south and had been escorted away on several occasions by Sea Harriers.

4.5 The Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) was an area declared by the United Kingdom on 30 April 1982. It covered the same area as the MEZ. During the Falklands War any sea vessel or aircraft from any country entering the zone may have been fired upon without further warning.

4.6 When ARA General Belgrano was sunk on 2 May 1982, it was outside the TEZ. This has led to much debate and controversy over whether the attack was legal. However, exclusion zones are historically declared for the benefit of neutral vessels; during war, under international law, the heading and location of a belligerent naval vessel has no bearing on its status[10]. Interviews conducted by Martin Middlebrooks for his book, The Fight for the "Malvinas", indicated that Argentine Naval officers understood the intent of the message was to indicate that any ships operating near the exclusion zone could be attacked. Argentine Rear-Admiral Allara who was in charge of the task force of which the Belgrano was a part said, "After that message of 23 April, the entire South Atlantic was an operational theatre for both sides. We, as professionals, said it was just too bad that we lost the Belgrano"[11].

5. Legal Aspect of the War/ Security Zones

5.1 The principal concepts of war/security zone or blockade, involves to varying degrees of denial at seas, freedoms of navigation and over flight to enemy as well as neutral vessels and aircraft in the

[9] Falkland Islands - A history of the 1982 conflict Archived 2008-10-14 at the Wayback Machine
[10] Belgrano legal action fails, BBC News Report, 19 July 2000
[11] Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", the Argentine Forces in the Falklands War

prohibited zone. Those freedoms, articulated in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, are eclipsed during armed conflict by the law of naval warfare, which specifically countenances interdiction of enemy platforms as well as measures that are designed to control neutral commerce with the enemy and prevent neutral interference with belligerent operations. High seas freedoms delineated in Part VII (High Seas) of the Law of the Sea Convention are "exercised under conditions laid down in this Convention and by other rules of international law." Those "other rules" include the law of naval warfare. Establishment of such areas has long been recognized as a legitimate tactic to avoid neutral interference in war at sea as well to keep neutral platforms from harm's way. However it does not permit the targeting of a platform that is not a legitimate military objective. Simply put, a belligerent cannot absolve itself from compliance with the law of targeting by drawing imaginary lines in the water.

5.2 The concept of war zones is broadly accepted; however its various versions (TEZ, MEZ, EZ etc.) are debatable, particularly with respect to the permissible expanse of the zone and the degree of force that may be employed to compel compliance with its strictures. Various sources specially the San Remo Manual, UN Security Council resolutions and naval warfare publications deliberate this subject in length on International Law[12]. The San Remo Manual is a legally recognized document but is not binding on states. The document in its section IV para 105 to 108 states following about (war) zone:

"105. A belligerent cannot be absolved of its duties under international humanitarian law by establishing zones which might adversely affect the legitimate uses of defined areas of the sea.

106. Should a belligerent, as an exceptional measure, establish such a zone:

(a) the same body of law applies both inside and outside the zone;
(b) the extent, location and duration of the zone and the measures imposed shall not exceed what is strictly required by military necessity and the principles of proportionality;
(c) due regard shall be given to the rights of neutral States to legitimate uses of the seas;
(d) necessary safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and aircraft shall be provided:

(i) where the geographical extent of the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to the ports and coasts of a neutral State;
(ii) in other cases where normal navigation routes are affected, except where military requirements do not permit; and

(e) the commencement, duration, location and extent of the zone, as well as the restrictions imposed, shall be publicly declared and appropriately notified.

107. Compliance with the measures taken by one belligerent in the zone shall not be construed as an act harmful to the opposing belligerent.
108. Nothing in this Section should be deemed to derogate from the customary belligerent right to control neutral vessels and aircraft in the immediate vicinity of naval operations.[13]

[12] San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1995), Prepared by International Lawyers and Naval Experts convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law
[13] The *San Remo Manual*, paras. 105 – 108

5.3 The above stated San Remo Manual articles 105-107 reflect the International principles and customary law which has evolved during 19th century. As stated in article 105 (above) belligerents have an absolute duty to respect humanitarian law whether or not the actions geographically take place within a zone vis-à-vis U.S., NATO, and other coalition naval forces have increasingly relied upon UN Security Council Resolutions as the legal basis for maritime interception operations. The inherent right of individual and collective self-defense which also include the concept of exclusion zone described in Article 51 of the UN Charter which states that *"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."* and on the traditional rules of the law of naval warfare.

5.4 There is no such treaty which can specifically prohibit the establishment of exclusion zone, provided that the State imposing the war zone can legally justify the zone as a measure undertaken in self-defence. With respect to customary international law, the practice of States and particularly the major maritime nations generally supports the notion that war zone's may be lawfully established again with the provision that certain conditions are fulfilled.

5.5 The Nüremberg Tribunal, in their judgment on Dönitz, condemned exclusion zone as a 'free fire' area[14]. This position is affirmed by the *San Remo Manual*. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that the declaration of a exclusion zone does not constrain the declaring state to the declared zone and thus does not grant enemy units 'immunity' from attack. On the other hand the declaration may be seen as a due warning to neutral shipping leaving them subject to enforcement measures from the declaring state. Such measures are however does not extend beyond what is stated in the San Remo Manual on the rights of neutrals within declared zones.

6. Exclusion Zones and International Law – An Analysis

6.1 International Law is replete with examples of recognizable "zones" in the waters of the world. Simply as an example, the index of the U.S. Navy's Commander's handbook on the Law of Naval Operations' lists four types of "zones". Accordingly, the idea that the oceans of the world can, for certain purposes, be partitioned into areas which have different characteristics under International Law is neither new nor controversial. None of the zones or other restricted ocean areas discussed in International Law, however, provide for the legal ability of a nation to create a zone which excludes the shipping of other nations. For example, as highlighted above as well, it is well-settled in International Law that a country may establish a temporary warning or "closure" area on the high seas as a means notifying shipping or aircraft that navigating in such areas may be hazardous. Nations frequently declare such areas when conducting weapons testing or other hazardous activities. However, despite the fact that these areas are sometimes referred to as "closure" areas, it is clear that: "Ships and aircraft of other nations are not required to remain outside a declared closure or warning area, but are obliged to refrain from interfering with activities therein. Accordingly, the controversial aspect of the MEZs which are the subject of discussion is the fact that nations have used these zones not just to warn, but also as an attempt to exclude adversary's forces. For example the Total Exclusion Zone created by Great Britain around the Falkland Islands on April 30. 1982 stated: "Any ship and any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is found within this zone without due authority of the Ministry of Defence in London will be regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation (as per Britain narrative) and

[14] The Nuremberg trials (German: Nürnberger Prozesse) were a series of military tribunals held after World War II by the Allied forces under international law and the laws of war.

will therefore be regarded as hostile. Similar warnings have been used by various nations since World War I.

The Important aspect of warnings of this nature is the fact that they are, in reality, threats and not warnings. Such threats, which propose to prohibit all shipping from an area of the high seas have never been sanctioned in International Law. In fact Admiral Doenitz, the World War II Commander in Chief of the German Navy, was found guilty of war crimes for conducting unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic pursuant to such a threat." Similarly, the Government of Argentina has been the subject of a law suit for sinking a commercial vessel navigating in the Argentine's Exclusion Zones mentioned above.

Foregoing in perspective, the nature of International Law on this issue becomes relatively easy to define. On the one hand, it is permissible to for a nation to warn others that navigating in certain areas could be dangerous. On the other hand, it is not permissible for a nation to attack or sink non-belligerent ships merely because they are operating inside an area of the high seas previously declared dangerous. A further "given" is the fact that warships of belligerent nations are subject to attack wherever they may be found and that wartime Rules of Engagement will generally designate all enemy warships as "hostile" therefore subject to attack.

6.2 Although the boundaries of law are relatively easy to determine, there remains a large grey area between these boundaries concerning the legality of MEZs. Using the British zone in the Falkland Islands as an example, what could Britain have done if it found a neutral merchant vessel operating in the MEZ?

a. If it would have attacked the vessel it would still be illegal as attacks upon neutrals are prohibited by International Law.

b. Visit and search. Visit and search is a recognized method for a belligerent to stop a merchant ship in order to verify that it is in fact a neutral ship and that it is not transporting enemy contraband. Although arguably the British would have the right to conduct a visit and search of the neutral merchant vessel. It should be noted, however, that neutral warships are not subject to visit and search without their consent.

c. The Capture Option. If upon visit and search it is determined that the neutral vessel is carrying contraband to or for the enemy, the vessel is subject to capture. A captured ship would be seized and taken to a belligerent port for subsequent proceedings in a prize court."

d. Force the vessel out of the MEZ. - It is a difficult question not specifically addressed in law. An argument can be made which would allow the ship to be escorted out of the area. Generally accepted procedures for visit and search provide for a situation where, if visit and search is deemed hazardous or impracticable, the neutral vessel may be escorted to the nearest place where the visit and search may be conveniently and safely conducted. If the MEZ has been declared because ongoing hostilities make the zone a dangerous area, it could easily be argued that conducting a visit and search would be hazardous enough to warrant escorting the neutral vessel out of the zone. (If, however the subsequent visit and search discloses no grounds for capture, there is no lawful way to prevent the neutral from re-entering the MEZ.) Although we have examined several lawful options for dealing with neutral vessels who enter an MEZ, it must be noted that each of these options fails to accomplish an important purpose of the zone. If the MEZ is, as was the Falkland Islands MEZ, designating a dangerous. wartime area, a primary

purpose of the zone is to prevent shipping from getting in the way and confusing the combat picture. The lawful measures for enforcing the zone all require significant resources and can divert attention away from the overriding goal of maintaining a clear and manageable theatre of operations. There is no lawful way to accomplish that goal beyond the mere hope that the declaration of the zone will serve as a sufficient deterrent to keep non-belligerents out of the way.

6.3 It is also important to discuss few more related aspects to the above discussion. First, a blockade, properly executed is a legitimate method of warfare. The method of dealing with neutral ships in a blockade are those of visit and search, and if necessary, capture as discussed above. Second, International Law is unsettled about how one belligerent nation can treat the merchant vessels of an enemy. Traditionally, merchants were not subject to attack unless provisions were first made to safeguard the crew and passengers, or unless they, by their actions assumed the character of warships. In World War II, however, enemy merchant vessels were routinely targeted by all parties to the war. Although the belligerents originally justified such actions as reprisals to the unlawful targeting of merchant vessels by the other side, by the end of the war, it was simply common practice. Because custom and practice are an important source of international Law, the practices of all sides in World War II have created a situation in which the lawfulness of targeting belligerent merchant vessels is still remains ambiguous.

7. Operational Wartime Use

From a purely operational point of view, the most advantageous use of MEZs is in target identification. In the words of the former Chief Judge Advocate of the Royal Navy an MEZ is used to "keep the enemy and others at a distance, and having warned the world, to immediately destroy contacts in the area, the targeting task of the operational commander is simplified tremendously. As we have seen, however, using an MEZ in order to attack indiscriminately all contacts within the zone is a violation of the laws and principles of Naval Warfare. Accordingly, the establishment of an MEZ cannot lawfully diminish the responsibility of a naval commander to ensure that all targets are dealt with as per the dictates of International Law. It appears, therefore, that the only lawful uses of an MEZ would be to warn an enemy that his warships or aircraft would be subjected to attack if found within the zone, or to warn (not threaten) neutrals that if they enter the zone they are going into a very dangerous place. In most cases, advising your enemy that you are going to do him harm, seems unnecessary. Advising neutrals of danger is always a nice thing to do and, to the extent that the warning is heeded and neutrals remain clear of the zone, has the operational advantage of reducing the number of contacts which must be identified. However, history seems to indicate that the use of such zones traditionally escalates to the point that warnings become worded as threats. Such threats are unlawful If carried out against neutrals and unnecessary against belligerents. Although the conclusions stated herein generally question the operational utility of MEZs, they are a tool which should be considered by the operational commander conducting warfare at sea. The advantages and disadvantages discussed above should be carefully weighed. If a decision is made to invoke an MEZ, then operational commanders must always remember that the existence of the zone must not be allowed to generate unwarranted complacency or indiscriminate aggressiveness.

8. Conclusion

8.1 In summing up we can make out that the declaration of war/exclusion zones were the tangible historic fact despite it has given different names and terminologies. Since it's a subject of maritime law and military strategy its denial and support is evident by the policy makers and the experts. . The

legitimacy of the exclusion zone is dichotomy of a social science which is considered never ending debate topic. It can however be concluded that legality of an exclusion zone must be determined from case to case. The law of naval warfare offers much to the planner who seeks to rely upon designing and implementing zones for battle space management in a concept of operations. Maritime Exclusion Zones may have some operational value, they are not a tool which should be routinely used by the operational commander.

8.2 In order to reduce risk of damage for neutral shipping the obligations imposed by the law upon the belligerent in creating such zones are high. At the tactical, operational and strategic levels, the law of naval warfare anticipates the assertion of belligerent rights within such zones that may override peacetime freedom of navigation rights of neutrals and which allow a belligerent to directly and efficiently control shipping movements within a defined zone. There is a need to develop consensus amongst the nations for having united rules with well-defined concept of an exclusion zone. As long as the world community does not reached to any concrete conclusion the academic activity, literately work and dialogue process in international forums/conferences be persist on regular basis.

8.3 At national level the subject should be kept for extensive and regular research at various universities (with strategic, International relations, war studies and law base) as well as think tanks and other similar institution and think tanks. Simultaneously Pakistan Navy should also continue to simulate to established exclusive/war zone during sea exercises for concept validation.

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